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Abstract  
 
Analyses of police statistics, newspaper reports, and United Nations international crime 
victim surveys (UNICVS) are used to describe trends in crime, and changes in perceptions 
of security, corruption and confidence in police in post-conflict Cambodia. These data 
show that both violent crimes (including homicides and police or vigilante killings) and 
property crimes have declined. Modest reductions in fear of crime are observed but 
confidence in police has not improved, although ‘street-level’ corruption is less frequent. 
Corruption, elite crime and consumer fraud remain serious problems consistent with 
Cambodia’s ‘fragile state’ status. The emergence of juvenile and drug related crime 
reflects demographic changes and the impact of modernisation (and urbanisation) on 
cultural practices. The role of modernisation and democratic transition in shaping the form, 
response to and extent of crime is discussed, as well as the effect of international aid 
focussed on criminal justice assistance.     
 
 
Keywords:  Cambodia, Corruption, Crime, Crime Victim Survey, Modernisation, Policing, 
Security, State Formation.  
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Introduction  
Long term Australian involvement in law enforcement capacity-building in post-conflict 
Cambodia provides an opportunity to assess the role of international aid in reforming policing 
practice. This paper focuses on the community standing of police and the extent to which 
policing practices have achieved ‘legitimacy’ in Cambodia. We draw on the significant 
decline in the level of crime as measured by national police statistics,  press reports and the 
United Nations International Crime Victim Surveys (UNICVS) conducted in 2001/02 and 
repeated in 2006/07.  We suggest that the dramatic fall in the rates of ‘street crime’ is the 
result of a nexus of factors that include modernisation (i.e. marked socio-economic 
improvement supported by international aid), relative political stability, and cultural 
resilience. However, regime capture, endemic corruption, especially in the criminal justice 
system, and lower tolerance to these burdens  have limited the positive effect that increased 
security may bring to state legitimacy.   
As both violent and property crimes have declined (the latter dramatically in rural 
areas), functionalist perspectives have some explanatory purchase but do not account for the 
high levels of corruption, organised criminal activities (e.g., Global Witness, 2007) and 
consumer fraud which are still evident. Indeed, predatory crime by elites remains a significant 
and unresolved legacy of the transition to an ‘illiberal democracy’ (Peou 2000, 2006) and 
regime continuities with the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) and State of Cambodia 
(SOC). The potential emergence of a ‘shadow’ state and kleptocracy in the context of the 
rapid development of a market economy is also a significant constraint on the legitimacy of 
policing institutions.  As the special representative of the U.N. Secretary General for Human 
Rights in Cambodia, Yash Ghai (2007) concluded in a recent report,  
 
…[T]he absence of effective institutions of government, basic laws, and an 
impartial judiciary, accompanied by continuing impunity and threats 
against those who criticize the status quo, increasing landlessness, and 
growing numbers of displaced persons all leave Cambodia’s citizens 
insecure, vulnerable to systemic denial and violations of their rights, and 
exposed to well-established methods for maintaining the existing 
economic and political order (p.1) .  
 
The concepts of ‘police’ and ‘policing’ are not indigenous to Khmer and ‘the idea of 
the police’ is relatively novel. Official rates of crime are remarkably low and are not simply 
the result of under-reporting and under-recording. Traditional concepts of order and authority 
are contextualised in patron-client relationships within a communitarian society governed by 
the ideals of Buddhist conduct. Peacekeeping and crime prevention are not usually 
externalised as activities of agencies such as the police, but remain, at least in rural areas, in 
the domain of village and commune chiefs. Social order and peacekeeping functions through 
social gossip, natural surveillance, reciprocal relations based on kin and village and long-
standing practices of mediation and reparation. Only the most serious criminal matters 
gravitate to district and provincial centres and, therefore, to outside scrutiny. 
The extreme case of Cambodia offers a unique window on how modernisation of both 
the state and economy modifies crime and violence (Arthur & Marenin 1995; Johnson & 
Monkkonen 1996). The Cambodian experience tests functionalist assumptions about how 
market development and state legitimacy suppress violence. Australia’s ten-year plus 
engagement through the Cambodian Criminal Justice Assistance Project (CCJAP) to 
strengthen the rule of law also provides a rare opportunity to evaluate police reform in a 
transitional state. Crime victim surveys, the monitoring of reported violence and interviews 
with key players provide measures of change in the nature and prevalence of crime and lethal 
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violence from which both the role of modernisation in a ‘fragile state’ (Anderson 2005) and 
the impact of the CCJAP can be assessed.   
Assistance to police in developing states has evolved as a response to international and 
regional cooperation aimed at suppressing cross-border crime and terrorism. Cambodia, due 
to its history and socio-economic circumstances, poses such a risk, and Australia, with other 
countries, has provided both financial and technical assistance to support crime prevention. It 
has also been assumed that developing police professionalism would support adherence to the 
rule of law and respect for human rights. A key motivation for assistance is national self-
interest and the need to strengthen counter-measures via bilateral and regional policing 
assistance. Thus, assistance is designed to strengthen the capacity of developing countries to 
combat transnational criminal networks and to avoid the creation of criminal ‘safe havens’ 
(Broadhurst 2003).  
In 2003, Australia provided AUD39.6 million in aid to Cambodia (about 9% of the 
total East Asia aid budget and one of the highest per capita) and about 15% of this figure was 
earmarked for better governance programmes. These funds also helped train and equip law 
enforcement for the challenges of local and global crime.  Since 1997, the Australian 
government has provided CCJAP with AUD30.6 million1 to strengthen the rule of law via 
police reform processes. A further AUD30 million is now being provided in Phase III (2007-
2012) to support selected legal and judicial reforms consistent with priorities set by the 
Council of Legal and Judicial Reform in the light of the Royal Government of Cambodia’s 
(RGC) National Strategic Development Plan (2006-2011). Priorities for aid are likely to be 
focused on juvenile crime, sustainable management of prisons and corruption (AusAID 
2007a, b). Reviews of earlier phases were critical of the effectiveness of the police-training 
component and have not endorsed significant further effort in Phase III (AusAID, 2007b). 
Overcoming problems in establishing effective policing in fragile states is a crucial 
factor in developing stable democratic governance (e.g., Donias 2005, with respect to Haiti; 
Bertrand 2004, for Indonesia). Measures of police performance and crime reduction (e.g., 
violence, fear of crime and confidence in police) are used to assess the level of security and 
the legitimacy of RGC law enforcement. Evidence from the UNICVS, attitudes to corruption, 
official crime statistics, extra-judicial homicides, election violence and interviews with 
Australian and Khmer participants are combined to assess the RGC’s standing as a ‘state of 
concern’. This paper therefore adds to the literature about the effectiveness of international 
policing assistance to post-conflict states and the nature of violent crime during state 
formation.  
We track key indicators of crime and security in Cambodia over 15 years (1992-2007). 
Data from several sources are used to estimate changes in violence as measured by homicide 
incidents, other violent and property crime victimisation, election violence and vigilantism, as 
well as attitudes towards crime and corruption. The prevalence of homicide and the severity 
of violence in Cambodia have been detailed and a decline in homicide has been observed 
(Broadhurst 2006). More recent data (as presented below) confirm this trend, which extends 
to crime in general. Why this has happened and what role the police have played in reducing 
crime is unclear. However, improvements in socio-economic standing, reductions in the 
availability of small arms and political stability are significant factors.  
Both concepts of wealth and political stability are used here in a relative sense. In 
relation to socio-economic improvements, GDP per capita has increased from approximately 
USD160 in 1992 to USD384 in 2006. General improvements in living standards have been 
observed. Infant and child mortality, illiteracy and TB have declined. The education level of 
girls has improved, although universal primary education has not yet been achieved and one 
                                                     
1 For Phase I (1997-2002), AUD12.6 million was allocated, and for Phase II (2002-2007), 18 million. 
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third of the population remains illiterate. Life expectancy is only 56.4 years; however, this is 
already an improvement on conditions in 1992 when life expectancy was estimated to be 
about 53 years. Some 35% of Cambodians were still under the national poverty line in 2004, 
but this was better than the estimated 47% in 1994 (Men et al 2005; Murshid, 1998).). Recent 
socio-economic data show further improvements and significant uptake of modern media and 
communication. UNICVS data suggests that most respondents also note improvements in 
economic standing. Since 2000, economic growth has averaged over 7% per annum and 
foreign direct investment has increased from USD129 million in 2000 to USD358 million in 
2005. Recent economic indicators show a rapidly expanding economy that is forecast to grow 
at around 9% per annum (ADB 2007). However, the government is still aid-dependent, 
relying on donor countries for approximately 50% of its revenue.  
With the slow but final demise of organised armed struggle between 1993-1998, 
political stability and the reduction of electoral violence have also occurred. Forty years of 
conflict, including revolutionary genocide, Vietnamese occupation and civil war theoretically 
ended with the UN interventions of 1991-1993 and the first national elections. The subsequent 
forced alliance of Royalist democrats (Funcinpec) and the former State of Cambodia (SOC) 
Vietnamese supported Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) was inherently unstable and lead to 
the 1997 coup d’ état and political violence during the second national elections of 1998. 
However, the 1998 elections completed the demise of the Khmer Rouge already seriously 
weakened by defections to either the Royalists or CPP.  
Regime stability was firmly established after the 2003 third national elections with the 
political alliance that arose in 2004 between the CPP and a greatly weakened Funcinpec. In 
effect this was the eclipse of the discredited Royalist alliance and heralded the complete 
political domination of the CPP.  In turn, the CPP had itself become dominated by Prime 
Minister Hun Sen supported by a formidable praetorian guard and ‘…power rather than the 
rule of law remain[ed] a reality’ (Peou 2006, p. 57). The dominance of the CPP was clear with 
the overwhelming support it won in the first commune elections of 2002, especially in the 
rural areas where CPP activities had traditionally focused. The second commune elections in 
2007 consolidated the position of the CPP even further and suggested that the 2008 national 
elections will continue to strengthen its political dominance. Once composed of former 
communists who are now unabashed modernists and capitalists, the CPP is set to remain the 
dominant power bloc for the foreseeable future.  
 
Theories of Crime, Modernisation and Development  
Functionalist theories of modernisation suggest that development will reduce violent crime, 
while at the same time increasing property and other crimes (notably those against the state, 
e.g., regulatory offences and corruption) as the rationalisation of modern governance is 
achieved (Durkheim 1950). Modernisation requires a shift in economic modes of production 
from feudal/mercantilist to industrial forms or from ‘Asiatic’ command to market economies. 
This shift in productive forces produces greater individualism and a significant middle class, 
weakens communal regulation, changes the nature of relationships from hierarchical to 
exchange and moves social control from informal to formal modes. Shifts from state 
command economies to ‘free’ markets are also accompanied by higher risks of corruption and 
plunder. 
In functionalist versions, modernisation in its early phases increases differences 
between rural and urban life and generates acquisitive crime by weakening social control and 
unleashing expectations, but reduces violent crime. In late modernisation, the gap between 
rural and urban life diminishes, but violence may increase as conflict re-emerges due to 
rapidly changing modes of production and the fragmentation of post-modern identities. 
Modernisation is usually measured by economic development and, following the European 
 5 
experience, the degree of urbanisation. Research so far has not found a clear association 
between economic development and homicide but has found a significant relationship 
between the latter and urbanisation (Alvazzi del Frate 1998; LaFree 1999; Newman 1999). As 
noted, Cambodia is one of the least economically developed and urbanised countries in the 
region. Thus, if functionalist theories about modernisation in Cambodia apply, then in an 
early phase, violent crime should decline while property crime increases and differences 
between the countryside and town are accentuated. 
Cultural integration or homogeneity, often associated with Durkheim’s (1950) idea of 
‘organic solidarity’ and measured by fidelity to religious, linguistic and customary beliefs, has 
also been hypothesised as a factor in societies enjoying low rates of violent crimes. However 
studies of the relationship between culture and homicide, using measures of religious and 
ethnic homogeneity, have not found a consistent pattern (see, for instance, Neopolitan 1997). 
Although significant numbers of Mhong, Cham and ethnic Vietnamese reside in some 
locations, overall, with more than 94% Buddhist, Cambodia has a high degree of religious 
homogeneity, which could play a positive role in the changes to its rate of violent crime.  
Moreover, according to Elias (1994), the civilising (or socialising) effects of modernisation 
render violence more problematic so that the latter is subjected to an intensified 
criminalisation process combined with an increasing reliance on bureaucratic surveillance and 
special policing institutions.  
The role of the ‘rational’ state through its security management (i.e., monopolisation 
of violence) and welfare functions is crucial in this civilising process. By improving health 
services, livelihood security, literacy and suppressing crime, the state legitimates its 
governance. As a ‘re-organisation episode’, Cambodia offers an opportunity to observe the 
nature of crime following a state-induced ‘collective disaster’ (Evans et al. 1985) and how, in 
the process of state formation, the establishment of a criminal justice system impacts on the 
prevalence of crime (notably homicide) and perceptions of security. For example, according 
to Archer and Gartner (1976), one of the effects of war is increased peacetime homicide 
arising from officially sanctioned wartime violence.  Cambodia has been exposed to this 
‘legitimation of violence’ mechanism and had a high peacetime homicide rate--which, despite 
the absence of reliable data on pre-war crime to confirm this hypothesis, might arguably have 
been the result of state-legitimated wartime violence carrying through into a higher homicide 
rate in peacetime.  
Following decades of war, genocide and civil dislocation, Cambodia has since 
undergone state formation and democratisation, and experiences crime differently to that of 
established states.  The political settlement that led to the re-creation of a constitutional 
monarchy in 1993 required the formation of a new state. However, the law and order 
institutions of this new state did not enjoy public support and legitimacy (Broadhurst 2002; 
Peou 2000, 2006). The absence of an established legal culture restricted the RGC’s ability to 
assert a credible threat to crime and disorder.   
Following other explanatory theories of cross-national differences in violence (such as 
opportunity/stress theories) crime and disorder in the new and fragile state of Cambodia might 
be the result of changes in the pool of potential offenders and opportunities for violence that 
vary according to economic and social hardships. Thus the relative size of high risk groups 
(young unemployed males), population density, household size, income inequality, 
unemployment and infant mortality have all been employed with varying degrees of success 
as determinants of violence. Cambodia, with its exceptionally young population, acute levels 
of income inequality and relatively high under-employment (reliable data on unemployment 
rates are unavailable) could also be vulnerable to higher risks of violence. Competition over 
scarce resources may be reflected in the high levels of robbery –murder (i.e., lethal robberies) 
that have been observed in Cambodia (Daly Wilson 1999).   
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Methodology and Results  
Three main sources of crime data supplemented by in-depth interviews with CCJAP staff and 
key Khmer stakeholders, as well as socio-economic trend data, have been used in this 
research. A major component of the study was a repeat of the UNICVS first conducted in 
2001 in order to measure changes in the crime victimisation experience, reasons for reporting 
or not reporting crime to police, fear of crime, attitudes to punishment and trust of police and 
other government officials. The UNICVS does not include homicide events; therefore, 
additional sources (e.g., newspaper crime reports) as well as official statistics were used. The 
objective was to acquire multiple measures of the level of crime and insecurity in Cambodia 
for 1992-2007 with the emphasis on the periods 1997-2001 and 2002-2007 that coincide with 
the two distinct funding phases of the CCJAP (AusAID 2001). The latter period represents a 
concerted effort at developing district and provincial crime prevention programmes while the 
earlier period was an ‘indirect’ phase focused on training, police reform and infrastructure 
development. With such data, theory testing and an evaluation of the impact of criminal 
justice reforms and crime reduction programmes in the context of economic and political 
development can be attempted.  
 
Official Crime Reports 
Crime recorded by the police from 1992 onwards is reported in Table 1. The overall rates of 
recorded crime through 1992-2005 have varied between a low 30.3 (in 1994) and a high 58.5 
(in 1998) per 100,000 population, and are low by comparison with developed states (see 
Broadhurst 2002). Since 1998 crime rates have steadily decreased to only 32.4 per 100,000 in 
2005. Estimates of homicide victims including suspect death, grenade events and common 
murder/manslaughter drawn from RGC judicial police and other sources from 1992-2005 (not 
reported in Table 1) show that suspect death and grenade events have become less frequent 
while overall rates of homicide victims have fluctuated between a high 12.9 per 100,000 in 
1993 and a low 3.8 per 100,000 in 2005. However, police statistics under-report crime (they 
measure police activity rather than criminal activity) and are often inaccurate and therefore 
supplemented by crime victim surveys and newspaper data.   
 
Newspaper Crime Reports 
From 1998 onwards, crimes reported by Cambodian newspapers were also monitored with 
special attention to vigilante and extra judicial homicides. Changes in the type of crime 
reported by the press as well as a decline in vigilante and police killings were indicated. In 
1998, 32% of homicides reported by the press involved police, military/militia or vigilante 
action, but this had fallen to 8.8% in 2006. Such data measure police probity, and decreases in 
extra-judicial homicides may indicate a strengthening of the rule of law; however, newspaper 
reports of homicides and other fatalities may not be a reliable index of these events. 
Nevertheless, the proportion of homicides among crime stories had also reduced from that 
reported in 1998. 
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Table 1: Crime Trends Recorded by Judicial Police 1992-2005 
 
 
   1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  
Number of recorded crime events 
Murder   429 599 303 397 542 317 793 581 571 407 425 509 511 448 
Armed robbery  1414 1613 905 832  1345 887 1822 1396 1252 1296 a 1419 a 1175 1320 868 
Grenade attack  40 157 79 27 54 46 68 42 39 21 10 23 33 20 
Rape   106 43 39 84 122 46 130 165 209 218 a 279 a 331 281 254 
Kidnap b  9 93 133 24 44 23 130 91 63 51 38 25 7 10  
Poisons b  14 47 42 23 24 21 0 20 31 n/a n/a 6 n/a n/a 
Patrimony c  8 6 20  12 6 n/a n/a 2 4 n/a n/a n/a n/a 3 
Theft   1420 792 835 896 1471 868 1871 1789 1827 1854 1846 1741 1503 1458 
Assault/disputes d 515 267 353 423 1050 445 1114 1058 1130 1131 1141 1301 1024 1010 
Fraud/pick-pocket e 23 117 163 214 233 97 244 246 218 116 f 202 f 160 f 113 f 104 f 
Illegal weapon  136 514 235 310 79 n/a n/a n/a 96 67 76 64 43 43                                                                   
Other offences  n/a n/a 20 n/a 668 208 905 639 387 g 381 g 309 g 358 g 161 256 g 
 
All crime  4114  4248 3031  3260 5638 h 2958 7077 6029 5827 5542 5745 5693 4996 4474 
 
Rate per 100,000 45.7 44.7 30.3 31.5 51.2 25.5 58.5 48.6 46.2 43.3 44.2 42.8 37.0 32.4 
Population i (mil.) 9.0 9.5 10.0 10.5 11.0 11.6 12.1 12.4 12.6 12.8 13.0 13.3 13.5 13.8 
 
 
Sources: 1998, 1999-2003, 2005 annual returns MOI Judicial Police Centre; 1997 data incomplete.  
Notes: n/a = not available; a = also counts robbery and rape murder; b = poisoning and kidnapping are presumed non-fatal; c = theft of cultural heritage; d = records only 
injurious assaults; e = offences combined in original source; f = pick-pocketing counted in theft from 2001; g = attempt killing is included: 2000 = 51, 2001 = 153, 2002 = 102, 
2003 = 87, 2005 = 69; h = total includes 201 injuries associated with grenade attacks; i = population estimates are derived from Asian Development Bank ‘Country Strategy 
And Program Update’ and are approximate; all data  revised December 2007. 
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Estimates of political and election related violence compiled by the UN and other human 
rights groups also show reductions. National elections in 1993 and 1998 were among the most 
violent, although this was not repeated in the 2003 elections. Hughes (2006) notes that the 
frequency of politically motivated killings has declined but they remain potent symbols of the 
continued role of political violence. Data compiled from secondary sources (i.e., UN Office of 
Human Rights in Cambodia and local civil society NGOs), police and newspaper sources do 
suggest that some political violence occurred in 2004 and was associated with the post-2003 
election stalemate that remained unresolved until mid-2004 (newspapers reports showed a 
peak in vigilante actions in 2004 compared to 1999-2003 and 2005-2006). National elections 
in 2008 will offer a further opportunity to observe shifts in presumed associations between 
violence and politics. 
 
Crime Victim Surveys 
The first Cambodian UNICVS was conducted in 2001 in Phnom Penh and five geographically 
representative provinces (i.e., Kampot, Kampong Cham, Kampong Spueu, Kandal and 
Kampong Chhnang). The second survey was completed in two stages: first in Phnom Penh 
and Kandal in October 2006 and, using the same procedure, in Kampong Cham in October-
November 2007. It was administered as a face-to-face household survey (N=2300 in the first 
sweep2 and N=2517 in the second). The crimes covered included: car theft, theft from cars, 
car vandalism, bicycle and motorcycle theft, livestock theft, attempted and successful 
burglary, personal theft, consumer fraud, assault (including sexual assault), robbery and 
corruption. A survey of mortality including suicide and homicide incidents in every 
participating household (a total of 790 households and 4683 individuals in 2007) was 
incorporated in the revised UNICVS protocol for the 2007 sweep of Kampong Cham. No 
suicide and two homicides were reported over the past five years. UNICVS also asked general 
questions about the reporting behaviour of victims, fear of crime, satisfaction with police and 
attitudes to crime and punishment. 
The annual prevalence of crime estimated from the first and second surveys showed 
significant declines in crime victimisation across all offence categories with declines in 
Kampong Cham the most dramatic. Small increases in robbery and bicycle theft were 
observed in Kandal but these were the only exceptions (see Table 2). For example, 
motorcycle theft, burglary and livestock theft all showed dramatic declines. The observed 
reductions in crime, while substantial, still revealed large gaps between the experience of 
victims and the records of police. Willingness to report crime to police showed some increase 
in motorcycle theft and rape, but in general victims remained reluctant to call on police. 
However, field interviews with key commune officials (i.e., Village Heads, Post 
Police, Commune Chiefs and Clerks) revealed that citizens frequently report crime, especially 
in rural areas, to the Village or Commune Chiefs in the first instance, but these are often not 
recorded by police at the district, provincial or national level. Thus, like official police data, 
the UNICVS under-estimate the ‘reporting’ level of crime victims. Respondents often referred 
to the problems of reporting crime to the police in terms of the costs: police often demanded 
‘petrol money’ or other fees (i.e., bribes) before taking action. Questions about reporting 
behaviour are especially useful in measuring confidence in the police and other criminal 
justice agencies, while questions about fear of crime gauge citizen’s assessments of security 
(see below and Skogan 2007).  
The decline in violent victimisation can be partly explained by the civilising effect of 
modernisation. For instance, the general improvement in the socio-economic circumstances of 
many citizens (observed during the Kampong Cham UNICVS) has lessened the incidence of 
violent predatory crimes such as robbery motivated by extreme deprivation.  However, the 
                                                     
2 With Kampot, Kampong Spueu, and Kampong Chhnang the total N was 3062. 
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simultaneous decline in non-violent property crime does not support the traditional 
functionalist hypothesis that with greater materialism and insatiable desire for possessions, 
modernisation also brings a sharp rise in property crime. Here a cultural interpretation, which 
can also account for the low levels of reporting crime to the police and a general mistrust of 
state institutions, seems more appropriate.  Strong Buddhist values and traditional forms of 
social control also help to inhibit criminal victimisation. While regime capture and corruption 
are likely to generate distrust in state institutions, manifested for instance in the unwillingness 
to report crimes to the police, there is also an enduring culture of self-help that has seldom 
relied on the central state to manage conflicts.                
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Table 2: One-year victimisation estimates and % report to police, in Phnom Penh, Kandal, and Kampong Cham 2000 and 2005-2006 
 
Phnom Penh Kandal Kampong Cham 
2000 2005 2000 2005 2000 2006 
 
Crimes 
 % vic % rep % vic % rep % vic % rep % vic % rep % vic % rep % vic % rep 
Car theft a 1.3 100.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
From car a 20.5 4.3 4.3 10.0 15.2 0.0 3.6 0.0 8.3 0.0 5.7 0.0 
Car vandal a 2.6 0.0 1.7 0.0 1.5 0.0 3.6 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Moto theft a 7.7 61.5 2.4 69.6 4.5 46.7 4.2 66.7 5.4 46.7 1.0 50.0 
Bicycle theft a  9.9 10.9 5.8 2.4 6.7 8.7 7.6 5.3 14.7 13.8 3.1 0.0 
Livestock a 20.0 5.3 8.2 0.0 19.1 1.8 13.6 0.0 24.8 8.9 11.1 1.3 
Burglary 16.2 16.2 7.5 18.3 10.5 10.0 6.1 15.4 12.7 11.4 2.2 0.0 
A/burglary 7.8 31.5 2.7 6.9 5.2 20.0 3.5 18.2 7.6 45.2 1.6 15.4 
Fraud 39.6 5.7 25.4 6.5 31.8 5.5 18.7 1.7 29.8 2.4 22.0 4.6 
Corruption 27.8 1.2 18.2 1.0 18.5 1.9 18.3 3.4 15.6 1.2 12.9 5.9 
Person theft 13.8 8.6 6.5 9.9 5.2 3.3 3.1 0.0 7.3 10.0 2.3 5.6 
Robbery 1.9 45.5 1.5 62.5 0.3 100.0 0.6 50.0 0.9 100.0 0.1 0.0 
Assault/threat 7.8 27.2 2.0 27.3 4.4 28.0 2.8 27.8 6.2 29.4 2.3 44.4 
Sexual assault b 1.8 8.3 0.2 50.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
Notes a % victimised calculated on number of owners; b  % victimised calculated on number of females; % vic (percent victimised) based on one-year prevalence ; % rep 
(percent reported) calculated on number of victims; for Phnom Penh and Kandal UNICVS 2001 and 2006, one-year estimates respectively correspond to 2000 and 2005; for 
Kampong Cham UNICVS 2001 and 2007, one-year estimates respectively correspond to 2000 and 2006.        
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Fear of Crime  
Over two-fifths of Phnom Penh respondents in our first and second sweeps felt unsafe or very 
unsafe ‘walking alone in [their] area after dark’ (46.5% in 2001 and 41% in 2006). In Kandal 
fewer respondents felt unsafe (39.5% in 2001 and 33% 2006), as did those in Kampong Cham 
(33.6% to 30.4%). Respondents also felt much safer ‘at home after dark’ with 29.5% feeling 
unsafe or very unsafe in Phnom Penh in 2006 compared with 39.5% in 2001 while in Kandal 
the proportion fell from 34% to 25.5% and in Kampong Cham from 27% to 22%. Overall 
more respondents felt safe in 2006 compared to 2001. The decline in fear as well as in the 
perception of the risk of burglary may be associated with the decline in the risk of crime noted 
by the UNICVS. By controlling political violence, regime stability has played a role in 
lessening feelings of insecurity, but again, cultural factors also play a significant role. , 
Communitarian attitudes generally prevail in Cambodia and individualism is not privileged as 
in the West. For example more than 95% of the UNICVS respondents declared that in their 
area ‘most people helped each other’. Such perceptions are likely to help build confidence, 
self-help and feeling of safety.         
 
Public Perceptions of Police  
In general, Cambodians are less satisfied with their police services than they were in 2001/02. 
Police enjoy some degree of legitimacy – a legitimacy that is conditional on a modicum of 
service and an absence of rent-seeking. Differences between the policing services are not 
measured, but in the case of rural villages ‘post police’ or local police are the usual focus of 
respondents.  In our interviews with local Village Heads and commune officials, problems of 
under-policing, poor equipment and inadequate numbers were noted (e.g., one commune had 
a police establishment of nine officers but only three were posted to the commune). Often 
reinforcements were slow to arrive and offenders had eluded arrest. A key factor in the 
legitimacy of police is the very notion that, if the police are called, they will come and order 
and justice can be restored. If the citizen believes this to be the case, then the mere threat of 
‘calling the police’ amplifies the efficiency and efficacy of the police (Proenca and Muniz 
2006).   
 
Many respondents, especially those in rural areas, commented on the limited response of both 
local and district police. Attitudes towards police have become more critical both in respect to 
controlling crime and helpfulness, with more people stating that police were doing a poor job. 
Nevertheless, about two-thirds of respondents felt police were helpful and doing a good job in 
Kampong Cham (compared to 70.5% in 2001) and over half remained positive to police in 
Phnom Penh and Kandal (compared to two-thirds in 2001). Despite the  significant decline in 
criminal victimization, including police corruption and the moderation of the fear of crime, 
this was not matched by greater public confidence in the police. Other results from the 
UNICVS support the suggestion that citizens now expect more professional and community 
oriented policing,  Although Cambodians often have a more positive view of their police than 
many respondents from developed countries, the impact of modernisation also render them 
less tolerant of crime and more demanding of law enforcement agencies.       
 
 
Corruption 
The UNICVS also asked respondents about their experience with corruption and their 
perception of the likelihood of corruption. Most experience with corruption involved elected 
commune or municipal officials and police, but the pattern varied depending on the location. 
Significant declines in actual victimisation were observed in Phnom Penh (from 27.8% in 
2000 to 18.2% in 2005) and also in Kampong Cham (15.6% in 2000 to 12.9% in 2006) but 
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not in Kandal (18.5% in 2000 to 18.3% in 2005). The actual experience of corruption had also 
decreased with respect to police (except in Kandal). In Phnom Penh, the proportion of victims 
of police corruption declined from 10.1% in 2000 to 5.7% in 2005 and represented 31.2% of 
all victims of corruption compared to 36.5% in 2000. In Kampong Cham the proportion 
reduced from 4.5% in 2000 to 2.5% in 2006 and represented 20.2% of all victims of 
corruption compared to 29.1% in 2000. In Kandal, however, the experience of corruption by 
police officers had increased, from 3.5% in 2000 to 4.4% in 2005 and represented 24.1% of 
all victims of corruption compared to 18.9% in 2000.  In the three provinces the most 
frequently cited officials by victims of corruption both in the first and second sweeps were 
elected commune officials.   
The perception that overall corruption by public officials was ‘more likely’ increased 
in Kandal and Kampong Cham between 2001 and 2006-07 (but not in Phnom Penh where it 
significantly decreased). In the first UNICVS, Cambodians were more likely to consider 
teachers, doctors and local officials as corrupt than local police; however, in the rural 
province of Kampong Cham this sentiment shifted by the second sweep when elected and 
municipal officials, as well as court officials and police, were perceived as most likely to be 
corrupt.    
 
Perception of corrupt conduct by police officers had significantly reduced in Phnom Penh, 
from 28.9% of respondents who felt police officers were likely to be corrupt in 2001, to 14% 
in 2006. However, in Kandal and Kampong Cham, respondents’ negative perceptions about 
the conduct of police officers had increased from 16.7% in 2001 to 19.8% in 2006 in Kandal 
and from 31% to 60.6% in Kampong Cham.  
 
Discussion  
The data indicate a substantial decrease in both property and violent crimes. A significant 
decline in homicide (including extra-judicial homicide) has occurred. Such forms of homicide 
are indicative of weak formal social control but, with greater regime stability, are far less 
common in 2006 than in 1998. Given the appalling trauma of the recent past, political 
conflict, the scale of economic adversity and the rapidity of urbanisation and social changes 
induced by market development, the current level of homicide is consistent with expectations. 
More developed neighbours also appear to experience similar levels of homicide but do not 
share the degree of social desperation or deficits in human assets. Indeed a rate somewhat 
lower than would be predicted by an integrated strain and cultural theory of violence may be 
indicated. 
While political stability and disarmament has led to a decrease in group-conflicts and 
war-legitimated lethal violence (Wille 2006), such events only account for a declining fraction 
of homicide in Cambodia. The general decline in lethal violence may also reflect the 
substantial improvements in overall wealth (although the latter is associated with declines in 
equality per Gini levels, especially in the 1990s) and the steady economic growth that have 
contributed to a reduction in extreme competition over resources and improvements in some 
basic services.  
Communal traditions, localism and pro-social Buddhist values have prevailed as 
potent forms of collective protection and could be reinforced by effective governance. The 
decline in crime shown by the UNICVS also suggests a high degree of social resilience 
among Khmer, especially in rural areas. These shields may be fragile and are threatened by 
the tendency of modernity to privilege individuality and materialism. High unemployment 
among young rural males also appears to be a potential stimulus to crime and disorder and is 
the focus of concern for many village heads and commune chiefs.  
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Theoretical implications for crime in a developing economy such as Cambodia are 
framed by both functionalist and conflict or ‘world systems’ accounts of crime. Functionalist 
accounts provide plausible explanations for the decline in violence, but are not consistent with 
the significant reduction in property crime and the apparent convergence between urban and 
rural areas. The new dynamics of modernisation processes in late twentieth century contexts, 
including globalisation and international aid mechanisms, may have cancelled or changed the 
effects of early modernisation phases predicted by orthodox functionalism. This suggests that 
modernisation theory itself needs to be modernised (or post-modernised) to better fit these 
new contexts and dynamics, and should give more prominence to the role of cultural 
influences.  Conflict approaches help explain transnational and state crime – notably the 
entrenched forms of corruption associated with the plunder and rent-seeking of government 
officials including police, although the experience of street-level corruption in Cambodia has 
also abated.   
This paper provided some assessment of an earlier Australian ‘forward’ strategy 
originally justified on humanitarian grounds but now re-designed to prevent, inter alia, a 
criminal ‘safe haven’ scenario from arising in Cambodia. As Australia becomes increasingly 
engaged in overseas police assistance it is useful to re-assess what may be achieved. The 
CCJAP example offers such an opportunity because sufficient time has elapsed to observe 
meaningful change. The data on crime and victimisation also enable reconsideration of the 
forms of engagement needed in fragile states (Anderson 2005). These data suggest that 
assistance via a police reform strategy may provide limited benefits in improved 
professionalism but that these gains may be compromised by the weakness of the court 
system and the absence of the political will to address corruption at all levels. 
Police reform in fragile states has often failed, and policing institutions have become 
part of the problem rather than the solution – either because they have been captured by 
organised crime or have reverted to repressive style regime policing. Although the risks 
remain significant in the case of Cambodia, the current evidence indicates that policing 
institutions have continued to struggle against organised crime and sought to legitimise 
themselves independent of regime politics. In this regard the results seem mixed: while 
reductions in police violence and actual police corruption are noted, Khmer are less positive 
and confident in police than in 2000-2001 – when both crime and socio-economic conditions 
were worse. There are also growing concerns about juvenile crime, which, unlike the general 
trend, appears to be rising.  So possible changes to the fabric of informal social control, 
induced by modernisation, are underway and create gaps that an under-resourced police force 
cannot address. Changing attitudes towards crime  and higher expectations about what the 
state should deliver in  response to new challenges to social control, have also raised the 
standards expected of police and accordingly public confidence in the police.            
 
Rule of Law and the Cambodian State 
The fragmentation of the original civil society by war and genocide has required a conscious 
effort to re-invent and reproduce the social and moral order of an ideal pre-war Khmer nation. 
The 1991 Paris Accords reconstituted, under UNTAC supervision, the RGC as a pluralistic 
state made up of the former SOC, Khmer Rouge and Royalists under the rubric of ‘Nation, 
Religion, King’. The functioning of state institutions and their agents independent of CPP 
politics remains weak with corruption and cronyism evident. The merging of CPP and the 
state now seems complete and the ‘regime’ exercises administration more in terms of 
traditional patron/client relations than rational allocation of resources. 
The transformation of the governance of state security from a military to civil form 
was a key goal of the first national development plan along with improving food and personal 
security, human rights, health, education and economic development. Under the 1993 
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UNTAC demobilisation plan, large numbers of former soldiers were placed in policing roles 
on below subsistence wages. Consequently, the management and discipline of such a large 
body of armed and ill-trained ‘police’ has been a major problem and source of impunity. The 
planned progressive reductions in the number of under-employed untrained police and 
military personnel required that by year 2001 their numbers fall from 137,000 to 67,000. In 
2001 this had not occurred; there was doubt about the effectiveness of the demobilisation plan 
and misuse of funds was identified by donors such as the World Bank (Adams 2001). 
Reductions in the size of the security forces and weapon availability had been hampered by 
factional differences in the key Ministries of the Interior (MOI) and Defence until 2003-04 
when CPP domination was completed. Although substantial progress has been made in the 
reduction of small arms, significant units of the RCAF remain beyond effective civil control 
or answer only to key officials. This appears to be the case with Brigade 70 and the Prime 
Minister’s powerful bodyguard unit (Global Witness 2007). Thus the overall civilianising 
process will continue to be complicated and some units continue to pose formidable risks of 
violence.  
However, while in 1995 the shift required from a military command economy to a 
market economy was burdened by the 62% of the RGC revenue absorbed by the security 
forces (Ministries of Interior and Defence), this has substantially decreased to 18.3% in 2006 
(ADB 2007). In 1998, as little as 10% of meagre revenues went to education, 6% to health, 
and 3% to agricultural development, but by 2006 budget expenditure on education had 
increased substantially to reach 19.2% and health 11.25% (ADB 2003; ADB 2007; Konrad 
Adenauer Foundation cited in Phnom Penh Post 1998).   
The RGC has operated in the context of a politically divided government of former 
antagonists - royalists, revolutionaries and socialists. Consequently, state institutions are 
complex and, until 2004, were open to factional conflicts, and an effective law-making 
consensual process has not been achieved. Historically, the Kingdom had a weak indigenous 
bureaucracy based on a French and Vietnamese colonial legacy in which recourse to state and 
legal institutions was grossly underdeveloped. Traditionally, the Cambodian state was 
hierarchical with the revered King, the elite government officials, the villagers and the 
Buddhist monks all in their place in the complex web of patronage and power. In crucial ways 
these traditional, often unmediated, hierarchical relations found their expression in the utopian 
self-sufficiency programme of the revolutionary (Khmer Rouge) [1975-79] and continue to 
shape Cambodian personal and social relationships (Chandler 1992, pp. 53-54). The ceaseless 
cycles of rice growing that define Khmer village life impose a natural social order based on 
communal surveillance, which reduces the need for intervention by the state. Accordingly, the 
role of police in creating order is limited to the extent that national uniformity may be 
required in the context of a devoutly Buddhist society. Pre-existing social identities and 
relationships account for the form of social order found in rural Cambodia.  
The new penal code started in 1994 is not expected to pass the National Assembly 
until late 2007 and current laws are based on the 1992 UNTAC criminal code. In January 
2002 this was augmented by amendments that strengthened the role of the MOI. The UNTAC 
code failed to provide a comprehensive ethical system or secure due process consistent with 
Khmer values, further eroding the legitimacy of law. Court procedural laws were eventually 
enacted in 2007; however, courts remain a concern and are widely considered unreliable. UN 
sponsored efforts to rapidly develop a modern court and dispute settlement process included a 
‘Judicial Mentor Programme’ that relied on guidance by overseas judges. This attempt to 
provide training for court officials (most former SOC judges) faltered because the poorly paid 
judges were prone to corruption or intimidation, and access to courts was prohibitively 
expensive to all but the elite. A substantial number of offences and disputes are resolved at 
the commune level without the involvement of provincial or national courts. Therefore, some 
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serious crime and much petty crime and disorder, as everywhere, will be under-reported. The 
UNICVS data also show that significant levels of crime, although reported, are not recorded.  
Supported by international assistance, the RGC has promised to develop a state of rule 
of law through reforms of the policing institutions, but shortages of human and social capital 
tend to mobilise under-paid policing institutions according to market forces and not abstract 
notions of the rule of law. Low salaries, poor training and patron style leadership induce 
bribery and corruption, and provide the thread of impunity that enables predatory corruption 
to thrive and challenge or even capture key elements of the state. Widespread concern about 
elite corruption is not simply a product of lawless behaviour but the absence of effective anti-
corruption laws and agencies with the necessary political will to enforce them. The recent 
discovery of potentially large off-shore reserves of oil and gas (on-stream by 2011) may be 
the key to the realisation of the worthy goals of poverty reduction and national development, 
but the large revenues anticipated may also be at risk of misuse by weak institutions 
dominated by regime elites. 
 
Conclusion  
If the assumption that strong states are more effective at suppressing ordinary crime is valid, 
then the evidence presented here suggests that the steady assertion of CPP dominance over the 
security forces has led to a diminution of the more extreme examples of violence.  It has 
reduced competition between faction ‘warlords’ and insured greater control over the diverse 
independent elements that make up the policing apparatus whose loyalty is now associated 
with a CPP-dominated government. Thus, in seeking legitimacy, the RGC has been able to 
give priority to security while increasingly diverting resources to other pressing priorities. In 
this sense, policing in Cambodia may be characterised as regime dependent, and it seems 
unlikely that the new legislature and King can establish the kind of supra-loyalty amongst 
these forces that may serve to limit their predatory tendencies and that of the new business 
elites.  
The plural democratic state envisaged by the 1991 Paris Accords, replete with ‘checks 
and balances’ and respect for law and human rights has yet to fully emerge, and elements of 
the state itself are immune from oversight. In this context, efforts at supporting police 
professionalism, while pivotal to the rule of law, may be counterproductive given ineffective 
courts and weak oversight of the executive by the democratically elected legislature. 
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